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On F. H. Bradley’s
“Some Remarks on Punishment”*
Thom Brooks
Most philosophers reject what we might call “penal pluralism”: the idea
that punishment can and should encompass multiple penal goals or prin-
ciples. This is rejected because it is often held that different penal goals or
principles will conflict: the goal of punishing an offender to the degree
deserved may differ and even undermine the goal of enabling deterrence
or rehabilitation. For this reason, most philosophers argue that we must
makea choice, suchas choosingbetween retributionand its alternatives. In
“Some Remarks on Punishment,” F. H. Bradley reexamines the justifica-
tion of punishment in light of a critique of Darwinism’s importance for
ethics. My primary focus is on Bradley’s substantive discussion of punish-
ment only because it is here that this article’s arguments have most rele-
vance for us today.
Bradley argues—in his characteristically abrasive style—that such
thinking is “one-sided” and misguided: retribution, deterrence, and reha-
bilitation represent different penal goals, but they need not be under-
stood as different and incompatible penal theories. What we require is a
new framework that can provide a coherent, unified theory of punishment
bringing together these different goals ð279Þ. Bradley’s aim is to dispel the
widely held view of his work on punishment as offering a strong view of
retributivism.1 Critics at the time, such as Hastings Rashdall writing in the
International Journal of Ethics, accused Bradley of defending punishment
for its own sake in his Ethical Studies.2 John Stuart Mackenzie argued that
Bradley offers “emphatic” support to claims his “view of punishment . . .
* A retrospective essay on F. H. Bradley, “Some Remarks on Punishment,” International
Journal of Ethics 4 ð1894Þ: 269–84. All references to page numbers are to this article, unless
otherwise noted.
1. See Thom Brooks, “Is Bradley a Retributivist?” History of Political Thought 32 ð2011Þ:
83–95.
2. See Hastings Rashdall, “The Theory of Punishment,” International Journal of Ethics 2
ð1891Þ: 20–31; and F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1876Þ.
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appears to accord best with the origin of punishment among early peo-
ples.”3 “Some Remarks on Punishment” is Bradley’s full-length response
offering an important restatement of his position in which he argues that
the “retributive view pure and simple will not work” ð274Þ. This is a clear
rejection of a still commonly held misinterpretation of his theory of pun-
ishment.
Bradley’s article is of contemporary interest as a first attempt at the
hybrid theories of punishment offered later by Rawls and Hart.4 The lat-
ter argue that retributivist and deterrent approaches answer different
questions and so can be brought together in a mixed theory of punish-
ment. Retributivist approaches ask why we should punish one individual
instead of another for a crime; approaches focused on promoting de-
terrence ask why we should punish individuals more generally.5 The prob-
lem is that it is unclear what role consequences genuinely play if indi-
viduals are punished solely in terms of their retributivist desert, and this
has led most philosophers to reject penal pluralism as incoherent or un-
attractive.6
Bradley’s solution to overcoming the problem of incoherence is ad-
mittedly unattractive. He argues that penal pluralism can be possible
within a new framework of securing societal maintenance ðor “the welfare
of the state”Þ through punishing offenders: “I find . . . no difficulty in the
increase or diminution of the penalty by considerations other than desert.
But, since the welfare of the state is used in punishment as the criterion
of desert, I would remark that such increase or diminution may be less
than is imagined” ð284nÞ. Bradley does not reject desert as a criterion for
determining the justification and distribution of punishment, but rather
he denies it can and should be applied in every case. The central idea is
that other penal purposes can be justified, and which we select will depend
on how best to promote societal maintenance. This framework overcomes
the problem of incoherence at the expense of creating a new problem re-
garding his strongly held communitarian commitments which few today
might accept.7
Nevertheless, Bradley’s essay marks a key historical moment in the
development of penal theories. The orthodox view is that different pe-
3. J. S. Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics, 4th ed. ðLondon, 1901Þ, 405 n. 1.
4. John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review 64 ð1955Þ: 3–32; andH. L.
A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility ðOxford: Clarendon, 1968Þ.
5. See Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” 5–6; and Hart, Punishment and Responsibility,
233–36.
6. See Douglas Husak, “Why Punish the Deserving?” Nouˆs 26 ð1992Þ: 447–64; and Rich-
ard Lippke, “Mixed Theories of Punishment and Mixed Offenders: Some Unresolved Ten-
sions,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 ð2006Þ: 273–95.
7. See Peter Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealism: Selected Studies
ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009Þ, chap. 1.
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nal goals cannot be united in a coherent framework. Bradley demon-
strates that penal pluralism in a coherent theory is possible, but there
remains the problem of whether it can be rendered more compelling.
This has significant contemporary importance because while many
philosophers reject penal pluralism, many sentencing guidelines embody
it. The Model Penal Code published in 1962 by the American Law Insti-
tute recommends incorporating multiple penal goals into sentencing de-
cisions, including retributivist, deterrent, and rehabilitative elements.8 This
code has had a profound influence on guidelines for other countries,
such as England and Wales.9 While penal pluralism is incorporated in the
decision-making framework for determining prison sentences influenced
by the code, these guidelines have been criticized for lacking in coherence
and any clear rationale for why some penal purposes are included and
not others.10
While Bradley’s specific proposal may require revisions, his ap-
proach helps to reveal how we might construct the coherent framework
we require for the penal pluralism adopted in our widely used sentenc-
ing guidelines.11 Bradley shows that penal pluralism can be possible. Our
project is to render it more plausible. Bradley’s “Some Remarks on Pun-
ishment” is an insightful, groundbreaking work whose history and poten-
tial for contemporary significance demands wider recognition than re-
ceived thus far.
8. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code ðPhiladelphia: American Law Institute,
1962Þ, sec. 1.02.
9. See sec. 142ð1Þ of the Criminal Justice Act, 2003.
10. See Paul Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law ðOxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008Þ, chap. 11.
11. See Thom Brooks, Punishment ðNew York: Routledge, 2012Þ, 126–32.
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